In April 2026, the U.S. International Trade Commission published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (91 Fed. Reg. 23190) to add a new § 210.14a to 19 C.F.R. Part 210, requiring parties and intervenors in Section 337 investigations to disclose (1) parent corporations/stock owners, (2) entities with the legal right to bring the investigation besides the complainant, and (3) third-party litigation funders and entities whose approval is needed for litigation/settlement decisions. Comments closed on the docket (MISC-051) in June, and Unified Patents filed comments strongly supporting the rule, while urging the Commission to close several loopholes before finalizing it.
ITC remedies are unusually powerful, which makes them unusually attractive to funders. A Section 337 exclusion order can block an entire product category from the U.S. market — a form of leverage far more immediate and severe than a district court damages award. That leverage translates directly into licensing revenue for whoever is bankrolling the case, regardless of whether the underlying patents have merit. Compressed eighteen-month timelines, no damages cap, a domestic industry test that can be satisfied by a single licensee, and the absence of fee-shifting for prevailing respondents all combine to make the ITC an appealing venue for investors who never intend to practice the patents they’re asserting.
Right now, those investors can stay completely invisible. Commissioners, administrative law judges, and Commission staff currently have no systematic way to know whether a hidden funder — including a foreign entity with no accountability to U.S. policy objectives — is directing the litigation. Respondents can’t tell whether a prior agreement with that funder should have barred the case in the first place, and the Commission can’t properly screen for conflicts of interest.
Disclosure of this kind isn’t a novel or radical idea. It brings the ITC in line with rules already in place in federal courts, including the Northern District of California and the District of Delaware, and with the direction the Federal Rules Advisory Committee is heading more broadly. And disclosure lets the Commission screen for conflicts, lets respondents evaluate whether prior agreements bar a case, and lets everyone involved understand who actually stands to profit from an exclusion order.
This increased transparency is why Unified supports the proposed rule. Our comment also recommends closing the loopholes for portfolio-level funding, attorney-investor structures, parent-subsidiary arrangements, and controlling individuals who currently fall outside the disclosure requirement, along with adding an ongoing disclosure obligation and real consequences for noncompliance.
