Expansion of AIA would have added $1.5 billion to GDP

In a new economic study, the Perryman Group has determined that enhancements to the America Invents Act’s post-grant review proceedings and increased use of district court stays would have saved the U.S. economy almost $1.5 billion dollars in gross domestic product (GDP), $712.7 million in personal income, and would have generated upwards of +6,792 job-years of employment between 2014 and 2019. That would have been in addition to the substantial savings realized of almost $3 billion already reported based on the current AIA regime. In other words, it could have been upwards of $4.5 billion of GDP savings, combined. This demonstrates that while the AIA has had a strong positive impact on the U.S. economy, it has fallen short of the benefits it could have accomplished with broader use of stays and a more comprehensive mandate. 

The study found that U.S. manufacturing would have experienced the greatest gains. It analyzed three scenarios: 1) If all court proceedings on a patent were automatically stayed after IPR was instituted, 2) if all invalidity defenses could be asserted in IPR proceedings, and 3) if both expansions had been in place. 

For 1), automatic district court stays, the Report estimates those changes would have led to an increase in U.S. business activity of an additional $543.1 million in GDP, $259.6 million in personal income, and +2,474 job-years of employment.

For 2), adding all defenses to the process, it estimates that adding those defenses would have led to an estimated $731.3 million additional increase in gross product, $349.5 million in personal income, and +3,331 job-years of employment.

And for 3) both, including multiplier effects, it estimates additional savings of $1.49 billion in gross product, $712.7 million in personal income, and +6,792 job-years of employment, noting that the benefits associated with Scenario Three are greater than the sum of the prior two if implemented separately, as the additional proceedings allowed if all invalidity defenses could be asserted would also benefit from being universally stayed while the IPR process is ongoing. 

Unified Patent’s Patent Quality Initiative (PQI) previously commissioned a study that demonstrated the substantial financial impact passage of the America Invents Act, and in particular, challenges like inter partes review (IPR), have had on the U.S. economy. That study demonstrated that U.S. businesses and the economy as a whole saved upwards of $2.95 billion dollars in gross domestic product, $1.41 billion in personal income, and generated upwards of +13,500 job-years of employment between 2014 and 2019.  

That study relied on the current AIA regime of post-grant review, where district court stays are inconsistently applied, limited grounds of challenge are available, and in practice—given recalcitrance to stay, confusion in caselaw and regulatory requirements like discretionary denials, and some resulting duplication of efforts between fora—the Congressional goals of providing a true cost-effective alternative to inefficient district court litigation have fallen short. Further study was needed to determine how much could have been saved over the same time period had district courts automatically stayed cases or had more grounds of invalidity been available in IPR.

Indeed, innovation has long been recognized as the key factor supporting U.S. economic growth and competitiveness. A critical element of the infrastructure facilitating product development and commercialization is the system that protects intellectual property and encourages its widespread adoption and implementation. The current framework that facilitates this process includes the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). The AIA and PTAB reduce the need for patent litigation, reducing costs and generating substantial economic benefits. Potential expansions of the AIA would lead to additional gains in business activity.

Economic performance in the United States over the long term is tied to innovation. The AIA and PTAB not only support innovation, but also generate substantial economic benefits. These benefits could be even greater with expansion of the AIA. 

The report is part of Unified Patents’ ongoing Patent Quality Initiative (PQI), an effort to gather and provide objective data and research demonstrating how lowering patent quality will inevitably lead to even higher cost and risk for U.S. SMEs, inventors, and manufacturers, and can lead to less innovation, fewer U.S. jobs, and a drain on the U.S. economy. Our PQI aims to provide data, studies, and testimonials to give policymakers and practitioners a clear picture of the state of the patent system. More information about our PQI efforts can be found here.

For far greater detail, read the entire report HERE.

Express Mobile Patent Narrowed After Ex Parte Reexamination

At the end of 2020, Unified filed two ex parte reexamination (Reexam) requests against patents owned by Express Mobile Inc., a prolific patent troll that has sued over eighty different companies for website development features. In early August 2021, the Reexam of U.S. Patent 7,594,168 concluded with a “Notice of intent to issue a Reexamination Certificate” that likely impacts Express Mobile’s infringement theories and still leaves open future questions about validity. The examiner narrowed claims that Express Mobile has argued repeatedly in court were much broader. For the first time, you can view every ex parte filing since 2000 on Unified’s Portal here. 

This reaffirms the Northern District of California’s and the Middle District of Florida’s stays of their cases involving the challenged patents. As the notice of intent comes less than one year after the filing of a request, patentees will be hard-pressed to argue that the ex parte reexamination process is too long to wait for a streamlining of their myriad infringement claims—if the patent is valid, it should be more likely that the reexamination will end quickly, and very little burden would be faced by the applicant due to a delay. On the other hand, if the challenged claims are invalid or substantially narrowed past the point of reasonable infringement, it would be a waste of resources to litigate. Additionally, in Express Mobile’s case, had the courts proceeded while the reexamination was still pending, the claim construction briefing would not have had the benefit of Express Mobile’s affirmative, binding disavowal of scope, and the examiner’s basis for allowance, itself probative for claim construction. See, e.g., Salazar v. Procter & Gamble Co., 414 F. 3d 1342, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2005). That is particularly true here, where the examiner concluded that Express Mobile’s references to the specification amounted to a definition, i.e., lexicography. Notice of Intent, pp.7-8.

And the Office went further.  For example, the examiner observed that if any non-object oriented formatting or styles are used in the building of a web page, it would not infringe the ’168 Patent. Id., p.4. Express Mobile disagreed with the Examiner for construing “entirely” as “only” in Claim 1, but its arguments beg the question of what “entirely” does mean, if not “only,” and whether Express Mobile has a viable infringement case based on the proper construction of this term.

Additionally, it will not be enough for Express Mobile to argue vague notions of what a timeline or transformation of a style is anymore: the transformation of an image object is limited to the description at (c), the transformation of a button object is limited to the description at (g) the timeline of both image and button objects is limited to examples at (d), and the claims specify that these settings are required for an image or button object for “each” web page on the site.  Id., 5-6; see also ’168 Patent, 30:32-33:46. It is unclear whether any of the pending product accusations meet these requirements.

And while Express Mobile filed a nonbinding statement disagreeing with the examiner’s characterizations, such post hoc self-serving statements are entitled to little weight, although they keep the interpretation open for an invalidity litigant or IPR petitioner construing the claims as broadly as Express Mobile. For example, Express Mobile disagreed with the examiner that the statements regarding image and button objects are definitional, citing the specification’s use of “can” instead of “must.” ’168 Patent, 30:32-33:46. This does not respond to the examiner’s point; “can” is not necessarily synonymous with “may,” and it should indicate limitation if the list refers to the only settings the user could employ. Here, Express Mobile’s points to no language that indicates that the “can” is exemplary and not limiting, as the examiner concluded.

The certificate also does not absolve Express Mobile of the need to address invalidity in its pending cases. The Notice made it clear that if a reference was not cited in its actions, then it was only given a cursory review, and no references other than the art submitted with the request appear to have been addressed by the examiner. Notice of Intent, 3.

Reexaminations are a valuable tool, particularly with Fintiv lingering. The Reexamination Unit has recently been processing requests much faster than the past, making their use to obtain stays a prudent option.  Reexaminations are also a less expensive option (and sometimes faster way) to extract claim scope disavowals and highlight infringement theory weaknesses even though there is little control over what the examiner considers.

The PTAB’s Misplaced Reliance on Litigation Trial Dates in the NHK Spring/Fintiv Framework

As discussed in prior blog posts (for example, here and here), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) has increasingly exercised its discretion under 35 U.S.C. § 314 (a) to deny institution of post-grant proceedings when the challenged patent is involved in related litigation, using the framework outlined in NHK Spring and Fintiv. See NHK Spring Co. Ltd. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., IPR2018-00752, Paper 8 (Precedential); Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (Precedential). A major consideration in the NHK Spring/Fintiv framework is whether trial in related litigation will occur before the PTAB’s one-year statutory deadline for issuing a final written decision after institution; if trial will occur before, the PTAB will likely exercise discretion to deny institution. The rationale is simple and seemingly cogent: due to the advanced state of related litigation, institution would be an inefficient use of PTAB resources and inconsistent with the America Invents Act’s goal of providing an “effective and efficient alternative to district court litigation.” NHK Spring, Paper 8, pp. 19-20. But determining when trial in related litigation will occur is not straightforward because litigation schedules often change. Over the past year, such changes have become more prevalent due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, the PTAB may deny institution based on a litigation trial date that ultimately falls after the statutory deadline. We discuss instances where this occurred below. 

• Next Caller, Inc. v. TRUSTID, Inc – Institution is denied but the trial date relied on is delayed by a year. 

TRUSTID asserted U.S. Patent 9,001,985 against Next Caller in January 2018 and amended its complaint to additionally assert U.S. Patents 8,238,532, and 9,871,913 in April 2018. See TRUSTID, Inc. v. Next Caller, Inc., 1:18-cv-00172-MN (D. Del. 2018). Next Caller filed an IPR petition challenging validity of the ’985 patent in October 2018; this proceeding was instituted and resulted in a final written decision finding some claims unpatentable and others not. IPR2019-00039, Paper 1; id., Paper 77, p. 90.

In April 2019, Next Caller filed IPR petitions challenging validity of the ’532 and ’913 patents. See IPR2019-00961; IPR2019-00962; IPR2019-00963. The PTAB exercised discretion to deny institution of each petition under § 314 (a), relying on the related litigation’s anticipated trial date in July 2020 versus the PTAB’s statutory deadline in October 2020. IPR2019-00961 and IPR2019-00962, Paper 10, pp. 14-16; IPR2019-00963, Paper 8, pp. 13-14. But the trial date was pushed back to July 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

•  Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc. – The trial date relied on in Fintiv itself is delayed and scheduled to occur months after the PTAB’s statutory deadline.

 Fintiv asserted U.S. Patent 8,843,125 against Apple in December 2018. See Fintiv, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 1:19-cv-01238-ADA (W.D. Tex. 2018). In October 2019, Apple filed an IPR petition challenging validity of the patent. IPR2020-00019, Paper 1. The PTAB exercised discretion to deny institution of the petition under § 314 (a), relying on the related litigation’s anticipated trial date in March 2021 versus the PTAB’s statutory deadline in May 2021. Id., Paper 15, pp. 12-13. But again, due to COVID-19, the trial date was pushed back – this time to October 2021.

• Ethicon, Inc. v. Board of Regents, The University of Texas System – Institution is denied based on an “expectation” of trial within a year but knowledge of delay; the trial date relied on is delayed over a year.

The University of Texas (“UT”) asserted U.S. Patents 6,596,296 and 7,033,603 against Ethicon in November 2017 (serving the complaint in December 2017). See Board of Regents, The University of Texas System et al. v. Ethicon, Inc. et al., 1:17-cv-01084-LY (W.D. Tex. 2017). In December 2018, Ethicon filed IPR petitions challenging validity of the patents. See IPR2019-00406; IPR2019-00407. The IPRs were suspended for about a year pending the Federal Circuit’s decision in Regents of the University of Minnesota v. LSI Corp., Case No. 2018-1559, addressing the applicability of sovereign immunity to IPRs. IPR2019-00406 and IPR2019-00407, Paper 11. After the suspension was lifted, UT filed a preliminary response in the 00406 proceeding without addressing the merits, arguing only that the Board should exercise discretion to deny institution under § 314 (a). IPR2019-00406, Paper 26. And the Board did just that, even though it was aware the related litigation’s June 2020 trial date had already been continued due to COVID-19, relying on the litigation court’s “emphasis that the parallel litigation should proceed as if still set for June 22, 2020,” “expectation of holding a bench trial within a year,” and expected final written decision issuance date of June 2021. Id., Paper 27, pp. 9-10. But trial did not occur and instead, a bench trial is scheduled for September 2021.

Interestingly, the same Board panel instituted the 00407 proceeding on the same day the 00406 denial issued. IPR2019-00407, Paper 29. The 00407 decision did not address Fintiv, but UT did not file a preliminary response in that proceeding. Id. UT disclaimed all challenged claims of the patent at issue after institution and the Board entered adverse judgement in June 2021. Id., Paper 33.

• Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Ramot at Tel Aviv University Ltd. – Institution is denied based on trial date that is now uncertain, but litigation is stayed pending Ex Parte Reexaminations filed after the denial.

Ramot sued Cisco, asserting U.S. Patents 10,270,535 and 10,033,465 in June 2019, and adding U.S. Patent 10,461,866 in an amended complaint in December 2019. See Ramot at Tel Aviv University Ltd. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 2:19-cv-00225-JRG (E.D. Tex. 2019). Cisco filed IPR petitions challenging the ’535 and ’465 patents in November 2019, and another petition challenging the ’866 patent in January 2020. IPR2020-00122; IPR2020-00123; IPR2020-00484. The PTAB exercised discretion to deny institution of each petition under § 314 (a), relying on the related litigation’s anticipated trial date in December 2020 versus the PTAB’s statutory deadlines in May 2021 and August 2021. IPR2020-00122, Paper 15, pp. 7-8; IPR2020-00123, Paper 14, pp. 7-8; IPR2020-00484, Paper 10, pp. 7-8. But after denial, Cisco filed Ex Parte Reexaminations at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) challenging validity of the patents in suit, and after reexamination was ordered, office actions issued rejecting all asserted claims.  Ramot, Dkt. 235, pp. 1-3. Thus, the litigation court granted a stay pending resolution of the reexaminations in January 2021. Id. When the stay issued, trial had been delayed from December 2020 to March 2021. The case is currently still stayed, with the trial date uncertain.

According to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the average reexamination pendency from filing to certificate is just under 26 months. See https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ex_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_21Q1.pdf. Here, Cisco filed its reexaminations in June 2020 and November 2020 for each patent.  Ramot, Dkt. 235. Thus, the reexaminations are estimated to conclude in August 2022 and January 2023. These dates are over a year past what would have been the PTAB’s statutory deadlines in May 2021 and August 2021, had the IPRs been instituted. IPR2020-00122, Paper 15, pp. 7-8; IPR2020-00123, Paper 14, pp. 7-8; IPR2020-00484, Paper 10, pp. 7-8.

Conclusion

Due to the likelihood that litigation trial dates change, the PTAB’s reliance on such dates to deny institution of post-grant proceedings under the NHK Spring/Fintiv framework has had unintended consequences, denying petitions (and an examination of the merits) when trial ends up occurring months after when a final written decision would have issued. The PTAB’s analysis of litigation trial dates under the NHK Spring/Fintiv framework should therefore not take litigation schedules at face value; instead, a more nuanced approach is needed that considers circumstances such as the current stage of litigation, issues that remain in litigation, and whether (and to what extent) extensions to deadlines and/or changes to the trial date have been requested and granted.

DOJ's 2015 Business Review Letter for IEEE and 2020 Supplemental Response

By: John Pierce — Legal Intern, Unified Patents

Standard Essential Patents (SEP’s) consist of patents covering technologies that are unavoidable (thus “essential”) in the implementation of new technologies under a standard. Said differently, an SEP is a fundamental piece of an advancing technology that all innovators must use to further develop the technology in accordance with a standard set by the industry. Standard Development Organizations (SDO’s) identify which pieces of an advancing technology will become a SEP. Each owner of a SEP is asked to provide assurance to license the technology under F/RAND (Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory) terms. This assurance commits the owner to provide access to their fundamental technologies so that the advancing technology can be further innovated by other members of its tech sector. This method of standardized licensing contracting hopefully provides an increase in continuity and a decrease in patent infringement litigation.

In 2013, the Department of Justice and the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office issued a policy statement on the remedies available for SEP’s that are encumbered by a F/RAND licensing commitment. The policy statement focuses on “patent hold-up” by patent holders. Patent hold-up can occur when an owner of a technology included in a standard gains market power. This increased market power can cause delays in licensing negotiations because the patent owner can potentially gouge the licensee for a higher price because alternative technologies are difficult to implement due to the standard. In summary, this policy statement does not specifically attempt to limit or increase the remedies available to patent owners with SEP’s subject to F/RAND licensing commitments, instead, the policy statement attempts to offer guidance on what important public policy considerations govern when an injunction or exclusion order should be granted. The Department of Justice does however give examples of hypothetical situations where injunctions should or should not be given. However, The Department of Justice seems to stray from this sentiment in the future and specifically attempts to limit the remedies available to patent owners involved in SEP’s with F/RAND licensing commitments.

IEEE is an example of an SDO and the development of IEEE standards and the use of patents is overseen by the IEEE-SA Standards Board. In 2007 the IEEE-SA updated its policy in an attempt to clarify the IEEE RAND Commitment. This update gave technology owners an option to disclose their most restrictive licensing terms. In 2013, the patent committee chair of the IEEE-SA formed an ad hoc committee to address the wide discrepancy held by industry leaders in the meaning of “reasonable rates” for SEP’s as well as other important issues that had come up since the policy’s rollout. IEEE subsequently asked the Department of Justice for a Business Review Letter, analyzing their recent change in policy concerning SEP’s. The Department of Justice determined that IEEE’s changes did not warrant antitrust enforcement.  One of the important policy changes made by IEEE’s policy update was to limit prohibitive orders that could be sought from patent owners. The Department of Justice agreed that limiting prohibitive orders from patent owners could help add clarity and allow parties to reach agreement more quickly. Over the next five years, the Department’s Business Review Letter was cited and applied continually by industry members. Concurrently, the Department of Justice became more involved in pending litigations on the subject. The Department, however, did not endorse the stance it seemingly took in the 2015 Business Review Letter. Specifically, when the Department of Justice became involved in litigations from 2017-2020, it continually stood by the patent owner and did not limit the prohibitive orders that a patent owner could seek. The Department of Justice attempted to clear up this seemingly contradictory behavior in 2020 with a “Supplemental Response” on its Business Review Letter from 2015.

The 2020 response essentially vacated the stance the Department of Justice held in its 2015 Business Review Letter. This stance was consistent with the way the Department of Justice had conducted itself since the Business Review Letter. However, seven months later, the Department of Justice reclassified the Supplemental Response as “advocacy” rather than “formal guidance.” This action effectively recertifies IEEE’s Business Review Letter as good policy. The motion to re-adopt the 2015 Business Review Letter coincides with the Biden administrations tougher antitrust stance.

What does this history mean for us now?

Currently, it is not clear how exactly the current administration will handle antitrust issues with SEP’s. The way the Department of Justice has handled the 2015 Business Review Letter for IEEE is an indication of how uncertain the future is for this area of regulation. Not only substantively but also procedurally, giving many a reason to call into question the BRL process. Specifically, the 2015 BRT prohibits the holding up of the licensing process by patent owners by limiting the prohibitive orders they can receive while the 2020 supplement turned its gaze towards the holding up of the licensing process by licensees. For now, it seems the Department of Justice is taking a tougher stance on antitrust issues involving SEPs, but until there is a new exclamation of the current state of the law, the question remains: Will the Department of Justice intervene and act according to the 2020 supplement or sit on the side line and stand by the 2015 BRT? In this connection, on July 9, 2021, White House issued an executive order, asking the Attorney General and the Secretary of Commerce to “consider whether to revise their position on the intersection of the intellectual property and antitrust laws.”  July 9, 2021 Executive Order on Promoting Competition in American Economy, Section 5(d).  In particular, the executive order asked them to consider “whether to revise the Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments issued jointly by the Department of Justice, the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology on December 19, 2019.”  Id.  Despite uncertainty, interesting developments are anticipated in this area. 

The Impact of Arthrex on Discretionary Denial of IPR Petitions

By: Tova Werblowsky — Legal Intern, Unified Patents

The institution of the inter-partes review (IPR) process established in 2012 by the passing of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) created tremendous opportunities for post-grant challenges of weak and unused patents.[1] The frequent use of these patents as powerful legal weapons wielded by non-practicing entities in costly infringement lawsuits has resulted in clogging of the Federal court system, huge litigation costs for large and small companies, and disincentivization of technological innovation and development. The passage of the AIA eased the way for third party challenges of patents through an adversarial procedure at the USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB), based on defects in novelty (§102) and obviousness (§103) features.[2] To initiate an IPR procedure, a third party challenger is required to show a reasonable likelihood of ability to prevail with respect to at least one claim of the patent, and is subject to denial of the challenge based on merit if this bar is not met.[3] In addition to merit-based denials, the Board can also deny requests based on purely procedural issues.[4] Congress has given the Director of the USPTO complete discretion with respect to institution or denial of an IPR petition,[5] but by  regulation, the  Director  has  delegated  this authority to the Board itself to which he appoints administrative patent judges (APJs).[6]  The Board then determines whether institution or denial of the petition would promote efficiency and fairness in each case, in light of its substantive merits. A recent set of precedential decisions based on the presence of parallel concurrent litigation of the same patents in the Federal District Court system NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc.[7] and Apple Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc. [8] discussed both the relative timing of the Federal court and PTAB case filings in addition to issue/party overlap and prior investment of the parallel court and parties among other factors. In Fintiv, a procedural hurdle was created for IPR challenges by subjecting petitioners to respond in detail to a 6-factor test upon a request by the patent owner for discretionary denial, which would allow the PTAB to determine whether pending parallel district court litigation of the patent should disqualify the challenger from a concurrent IPR.[9]

The decision by the Board is the last word with respect to the Patent Office decision- the Director has no control over the final outcome. The only recourse for a party who is dissatisfied with a final PTAB decision is to seek judicial review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, at which point the Director is able to intervene before the court to defend or disavow the Board’s decision.[10]

The statistics since Fintiv have already shown that discretionary procedural denials of IPR review are increasing and will likely continue to do so as a result of the subjectivity of the requirements introduced by this precedent case.[11] This outcome seems to run counter to the goal of post grant review, which is to prevent the proliferation of bad patents, and thereby to discourage excessive litigation and encourage innovation.

The recent landmark Supreme Court decision, U.S. v. Arthrex, offers a new potential avenue for solution of this problem by forcing a rebalancing of power within the USPTO itself. The Arthrex case questioned the fundamental validity of the IPR process by challenging the authority of the APJs to make final decisions regarding patent validity on behalf of the Executive Branch of the government. The argument by the patent owner in Arthrex was that any Board decision is ultimately delegated directly by the President and therefore can only be made by “superior officers” of the Executive branch, who are appointed directly by the President and confirmed by the Senate, as Constitutionally required by the Appointments Clause. While the Director of the PTAB is appointed by the President with Senate approval, the APJ’s are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, placing them in the role of “inferior officers” of the Executive Branch who therefore should not be allowed to make final, incontestable decisions. The patent owner in Arthrex argued that since APJs are inferior officers the entire structure of the IPR process is therefore inherently unconstitutional.[12] The Supreme Court majority in Arthrex held that the remedy for this status discrepancy would be to give back the power of review of all Board decisions to the Director of the USPTO, and this way “the President remains responsible for the exercise of executive power—and through him, the exercise of executive power remains accountable to the people.”[13]

The implications of the Arthrex decision for Fintiv-like procedural denials are tremendous: removing sole discretion for denial of an IPR petition from the Board and placing review power back into the hands of an appointed official means that the public­—and therefore patent owners and corporations—can once again have a say in the institution of patent review through the democratic process. The subjectivity of the 6-factor Fintev test for individual cases can be mitigated by placing ultimate control back in the hands of the Director, who is not necessarily the technical expert but who can assess the overall ramifications of IPR denials in the broader political and technological landscape. By doing so, the goals of the AIA and IPR process can be better achieved, while at the same time conforming to the Constitutional aims of democratic process.

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[1] https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/20110916-pub-l112-29.pdf

[2] https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trials/inter-partes-review.

[3] 35 U. S. C. §314(a).

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] 35 U.S.C. §143.

[7] IPR2018-00752 (Paper 8) at 20 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2018)

[8] IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2020)

[9] Id. at 6.

[10] 35 U.S.C. § 143

[11] https://www.unifiedpatents.com/insights?offset=1625698876172

[12] U.S. v. Arthrex 594 U.S. 594 (2021

[13] United States v. Arthrex 594 U.S. 617 (2021)